Series 1: The Making of a Public Servant

Tape 1: "Coming of Age"

In this tape, Mr. Rusk's accounts of his early childhood in Georgia and his varied educational background award a privileged grasp of the making of this statesman's leadership abilities. The conversation follows Mr. Rusk from his first job experiences in Atlanta to his entrance into Davidson College, and pursues him across the Atlantic to his years at Oxford and in pre-war Germany. He credits his early childhood experiences and his proximity to world-shaping events while at Oxford for the development of his interest in world affairs.

Tape 2: "Military Service to Civil Service"

In this dialogue, Mr. Rusk illustrates the correlation between his military service and his civil service with accounts of his experiences serving in India during World War II, through the term he served as Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs during the Truman Administration, to his role as Secretary of State, with an insight gained through vast service experience, Mr. Rusk discusses the Korean War, the limitations of "Intelligence", the responsibility of the Secretary of State, and the significant impact of a commitment to public service.

Series 2: The Making of Foreign Policy

Tape 1: "The Four Engines of Foreign Policy"

Beginning with his unexpected nomination by President Kennedy, Dean Rusk imparts his leadership philosophy as Secretary of State. Citing his extensive experience, he emphasizes the importance of competence and moderation over untested innovation in formulating foreign policy. Once the Secretary has set the diplomatic agenda, he must delegate authority while ensuring that the enormous bureaucracy implements the policy consistently. Mr. Rusk then depicts the four engines of foreign policy: direct access to the President, close ties to Congress, working relationships with career government officials, and effective communication with the media and the public.

Tape 2: "Congress and the Media"

Describing the influence of Congress and the media, Mr. Rusk acknowledges that since Vietnam, Capitol Hill has exerted increasing pressure on the White House in matters of foreign policy. The former Secretary found legislators competent in international affairs and divided by genuine policy difference, not partisan posturing. Mr. Rusk regrets that the media, in looking for brief answers to broad questions, inadequately covers many international issues. Finally, he argues that the media's overly pessimistic reporting ignores many positive events and thereby distorts reality.

Tape 3: "The Press and the Presidents"

Television, the same invention that rankled Dean Rusk during Vietnam, now enables him to share his experiences of the press and the Presidents. Indeed, the television has mounted tremendous pressure on the Secretary of State. In addition to outmaneuvering White House print reporters, now the secretary must announce decisions in time for the evening news. Mr. Rusk warns that the media can distort foreign policy by oversimplifying or sensationalizing complex issues. Then remembering his days in the White House, the former Secretary highlights the distinct leadership styles of Kennedy and Johnson and recalls the tension between himself and Robert Kennedy.

Series 3: The War in Vietnam

Tape 1: "Vietnam: The Unclaimed War"

Dean Rusk has been widely criticized for his role in the Vietnam War, but watching this dialogue, one appreciates the difficulty of making decisions in the complicated historical context he depicts. Emphasizing the importance of "collective security" Mr. Rusk explains why, in his opinion, Vietnamese aggression required American involvement lest our allies and the Soviets doubt our resolve. He laments the tragic cost of containment but even more poignantly fears the erosion of this commitment by generations with no memory of the Second World War.

Tape 2: "The American Descent into Vietnam"

In this dialogue, Dean Rusk recalls the events that mired the United States deeper into the Vietnam conflict. His position as an insider now enables the former secretary to dispel popular misconceptions about American involvement. First he acknowledges that the United States knew of the impending overthrow of the Diem regime. Then, he refutes the suspicion that President Kennedy had intended to maintain U.S. forces in Vietnam merely to ensure his reelection. Describing President Johnson's role, Mr. Rusk reveals that the White House wrote a draft of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before that incident actually occurred. Finally, Mr. Rusk regrets that the peace movement undermined the American war effort and ultimately facilitated a Vietnamese political victory.

Tape 3: "Vietnam Credibility and Collective Security"

In this conversation, Mr. Rusk illuminates the dilemmas of collective security in a democratic system. Citing the anti-war movement during the Vietnam Conflict, he explains that the very openness and freedom of democracy make these principles more difficult to defend. Indeed, the secretary of state, serving the public interest in wartime, is simultaneously accountable to the public opinion that discourages the war effort. Mr. Rusk regrets that the loss of domestic credibility in the Vietnam era inhibited U.S. officials from safeguarding the long-term interest of the nation. He asserts few Americans considered the urgency of our alliances; abandoning Southeast Asia, in his opinion, would have weakened NATO considerably. Notwithstanding the problems caused by a reluctant public, Mr. Rusk and others chose not to rally the home front to an angry frenzy, fearing the danger of widespread jingoism in a fragile nuclear world.

Series 4: U.S.-Soviet Relations

Tape 1: "Demobilization to Détente"

Recounting the history of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Dean Rusk states that rapid U.S. demobilization after World War II tempted Stalin to expand militarily. Although relations have often been hostile both countries have exercised sufficient restraint to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Realizing this mutual interest, the superpowers have sought to defuse tense situations. Nonetheless, Mr. Rusk argues, persistent points of confrontation require a concerted national defense.

Tape 2: "The Kennedy Years: A Time of Crisis"

In this dialogue, Mr. Rusk shares his inside knowledge from the crises of the Kennedy years. The former Secretary explains the mismanagement and confusion that led to the fumbling of the Bay of Pigs operation. He then posits a connection between the situations in Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam. In his opinion, Khrushchev placed missiles in Cuba, and Kennedy sent troops to Vietnam, to bolster their respective positions in Berlin. He believes the most crucial American decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis was enabling the Soviets to back down without losing face. Mr. Rusk concludes, the high tensions during this time awakened both sides to the exigency of preventing future crises.

Tape 3: "Soviet Personalities and Perceptions"

In this dialogue, former Secretary Rusk illustrates the intricacies of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy. Since neither nation has complete information about the other, Mr. Rusk explains, perceptions play a crucial role in negotiations. In this sensitive game, personalities can distort policy and complicate dialogue. To remove that element, Mr. Rusk emphasized protocol and professionalism in his relations with his Soviet counterparts. But the Secretary of State, he explains, must often see beyond formal posturing to understand true Soviet intentions. Mr. Rusk's greatest hope is that the superpowers will recognize their fundamental common interest, put aside their games, and face the task of ensuring world peace.

Series 5: The Nuclear Age

Tape 1: "Crisis Management in a Nuclear Age"

Mr. Rusk ruminates over the unique problems of the nuclear age, beginning with the agonizing decision to drop the bomb on Japan. Emphasizing the ground laying agreements of the Kennedy and Johnson years, he recalls American efforts to control nuclear arms. Praising the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, he warns against reliance upon missile defense technology that would spiral the arms race out of control. Looking forward, Mr. Rusk envisions an agreement establishing a nuclear free Europe. Finally, he debunks the myth of limited nuclear war and asserts that any atomic exchange would utterly destroy the planet.

Tape 2: "Surviving in a Nuclear World"

Mr. Rusk explores the responsibilities of leaders and citizens in the atomic age. He begins with a history of nuclear strategy from "massive retaliation" to "mutually assured destruction", which, he believes, has prevented World War Three. Acknowledging that discrepancies between American and Soviet nuclear arsenals matter little in military terms, he explains why even small imbalances can influence perceptions and tempt one side to intimidate the other. Despite this fragility, however, Mr. Rusk praises the greatest accomplishment of the postwar era -- that a nuclear weapon has not been fired in anger for over forty years. He scorns doomsday talk and challenges the younger generation to settle U.S.-Soviet differences and confront the pressing problems of population growth, resource depletion, and environmental degradation.

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